MBE Evidence Hearsay Exception Sample Question + Ruling
Study a fresh MBE hearsay exception problem focused on excited utterances, with a ruling analysis, distractor notes, and a short quiz teaser.
Study a fresh MBE hearsay exception problem focused on excited utterances, with a ruling analysis, distractor notes, and a short quiz teaser.
During a late-night pharmacy robbery, a masked person shoved the cashier, grabbed a bag of prescription drugs, and ran out. Less than a minute later, while shaking and crying, the cashier told Officer Reed, "It was the tall mechanic from the garage next door. I recognized his voice and the dragon tattoo on his wrist." At trial, the cashier testified but could no longer remember the robber's identity. The prosecution offered Officer Reed's account of the cashier's statement, and the defense objected on hearsay grounds.
Officer Reed's testimony about the cashier's statement is likely admissible as an excited utterance because it was made almost immediately after the robbery while the cashier was still under the stress of the event. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), a statement relating to a startling event or condition is admissible if the declarant made it while under the stress of excitement caused by the event. The rationale is that the excitement reduces the chance of calculated fabrication. Courts look at timing, the declarant's condition, and whether the statement was a reaction to the event rather than a calm narrative assembled after reflection.
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Is the cashier's statement to Officer Reed admissible as an excited utterance, or is it inadmissible hearsay?
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), a statement relating to a startling event or condition is admissible if the declarant made it while under the stress of excitement caused by the event. The rationale is that the excitement reduces the chance of calculated fabrication. Courts look at timing, the declarant's condition, and whether the statement was a reaction to the event rather than a calm narrative assembled after reflection.
The robbery is plainly a startling event, and the statement directly related to that event because the cashier identified the robber. The timing is favorable to admissibility: Officer Reed heard the statement less than a minute after the robbery. Just as important, the cashier was still visibly shaking and crying, which strongly suggests the stress of the event had not dissipated. Those facts support the prosecution's argument that the statement was spontaneous rather than reflective. The defense can respond that the statement contained a fairly detailed identification, including both a voice recognition and a tattoo reference, and that detail may imply some level of thought. But detail alone does not defeat the exception. A stressed declarant can still blurt out identifying features if those details were perceived during the event and spoken while the stress remained intense. Because the cashier later forgot the identity at trial, Officer Reed's testimony matters, but the memory failure does not block the exception. The key question is the cashier's state at the moment of the original statement, not the cashier's later recollection.
Officer Reed's testimony about the cashier's statement is likely admissible as an excited utterance because it was made almost immediately after the robbery while the cashier was still under the stress of the event.
The content of the statement does not bar the exception if it was made while the declarant was still under the event's stress.
Present sense impression is a different theory. The stronger fit here is excited utterance because the declarant was visibly upset after a startling event.
Availability is not required for Rule 803(2). The exception applies whether or not the declarant later testifies.
A brief question does not automatically destroy spontaneity if the declarant is still under the stress of the event.