Study an easement-by-necessity question with examiner-style analysis on prior unity of title, severance, strict necessity, and alternative-access arguments.
For decades, Rowan owned two adjacent tracts: a roadside parcel and a rear parcel bordered on three sides by steep ravines and on the fourth by the roadside tract. The only practical route to the rear parcel was a gravel lane crossing the roadside tract. Rowan then sold the rear parcel to Dana by warranty deed, but the deed said nothing about access rights. After the sale, Rowan sold the roadside parcel to Ellis, who immediately locked the gravel-lane gate and told Dana to build a helicopter pad or negotiate a new deal. Dana shows that she could theoretically reach the rear parcel by constructing a costly bridge over one ravine and clearing a path through rocky terrain, but doing so would cost more than the land is worth. Dana sues for an easement by necessity over the gravel lane.
Dana should receive an easement by necessity over the gravel lane because the severance left the rear parcel effectively landlocked and the supposed alternatives are not reasonably practical access. An easement by necessity may be implied when a single owner once held both parcels, severed them, and the severance left one parcel with no practical access to a public road or other legally usable outlet. The doctrine rests on presumed intent and public policy against landlocking property. The claimant must show prior unity of title, severance of that title, and necessity at the time of severance. Mere convenience is insufficient, but strict necessity does not require literal impossibility if the alternatives are so unreasonable, unavailable, or disproportionate that the parcel is effectively landlocked.
Is Dana entitled to an easement by necessity over Ellis's parcel even though the deed was silent and some physically possible but wildly impractical access alternatives exist?
An easement by necessity may be implied when a single owner once held both parcels, severed them, and the severance left one parcel with no practical access to a public road or other legally usable outlet. The doctrine rests on presumed intent and public policy against landlocking property. The claimant must show prior unity of title, severance of that title, and necessity at the time of severance. Mere convenience is insufficient, but strict necessity does not require literal impossibility if the alternatives are so unreasonable, unavailable, or disproportionate that the parcel is effectively landlocked.
Dana has a strong easement-by-necessity claim. Rowan plainly owned both parcels before the sale, satisfying prior unity of title…