The Jurisdiction Puzzle

Model answer

**1. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION - FAILS** Federal diversity jurisdiction requires COMPLETE diversity and amount over $75,000. - Paula: FL citizen - BrakeCo: FL citizen (incorporated AND headquartered in FL) - NO complete diversity, so the case cannot proceed AS PLEADED unless the jurisdictional defect is properly cured (a dispensable nondiverse party can sometimes be dropped under Rule 21) - SMJ can be raised at ANY time—never waived

**2. SERVICE ON AUTOCORP - TWO CATEGORIES OF PROBLEM: INVALID METHOD AND UNTIMELY SERVICE** Most answers give only the deadline. The METHOD is the larger problem, and it contains several distinct defects. - METHOD - several independent defects. FRCP 4(c)(1) requires a SUMMONS to be served WITH a copy of the complaint, and Paula mailed the complaint alone - decisive on its own. And FRCP 4(c)(2) permits service only by a person who is at least 18 AND NOT A PARTY - so if, as the wording indicates, Paula personally performed the mailing, that is an additional defect: even a properly assembled packet would have been served by a disqualified person. The missing summons is independently decisive either way. FRCP 4(h)(1)(B) then requires DELIVERING the summons and complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, OR any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service (with an additional mailing where the authorizing statute so requires) - and mailing to a corporate headquarters, without delivery to an identified officer or authorized agent, is not delivery to any of those. The alternative route, FRCP 4(h)(1)(A) via 4(e)(1), borrows the law of the state where the court sits or where service is made; these facts show no compliance with any authorized state-law method. (Rule 4(d) does permit MAILING a request to WAIVE service - but formal service is excused only if the defendant SIGNS AND RETURNS the waiver, which did not happen.) AutoCorp was therefore never properly served at all. - WAIVER? NO - and this is worth a sentence, because it looks like a trap. AutoCorp moved on day 40 raising only personal jurisdiction, so one might ask whether Rules 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1) waived its service objections too. They did not. Rule 12(g)(2) reaches only a defense that was AVAILABLE TO THE PARTY when it made the earlier motion, and on day 40 Paula had not yet attempted service on AutoCorp - there was no service to call insufficient. Every one of these defects came into existence only with the day-95 mailing - whether framed under Rule 12(b)(4) or 12(b)(5) - so none was available on day 40 and none was waived. (On classification: the MISSING-SUMMONS defect is ordinarily framed as insufficient PROCESS under Rule 12(b)(4), while the party-server and delivery defects are insufficient SERVICE under Rule 12(b)(5). Nothing here turns on the allocation - what matters is that NONE of them existed on day 40.) Contrast VENUE: whatever improper-venue defense AutoCorp had was available to it on day 40, so omitting it waived it (section 4). - TIMING: FRCP 4(m) allows 90 days from FILING. Paula attempted service on day 95. Get the remedy right too, because it is disjunctive and most answers overstate it: on motion or on its own AFTER NOTICE TO THE PLAINTIFF, the court must either dismiss without prejudice as to that defendant OR order that service be made within a specified time. If Paula shows GOOD CAUSE the court MUST extend; and even absent good cause the court has DISCRETION to extend rather than dismiss (Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996)).

**3. PERSONAL JURISDICTION - TIMELY PRESERVED; MERITS UNRESOLVED** AutoCorp raised PJ in its first filing (motion to dismiss), which is timely under FRCP 12, so the defense is PRESERVED. Stop there: these facts give no AutoCorp contacts with Florida, so they do not establish whether the defense actually SUCCEEDS. Preserved is not the same as meritorious.

**4. VENUE - ANY AVAILABLE DEFENSE WAIVED** First, be careful what these facts establish: they do NOT tell you where the accident happened or what contacts either corporation has with the Southern District, so you cannot conclude that venue actually WAS improper. That does not matter to the point being tested. Whatever improper-venue defense was available to AutoCorp on day 40, it did NOT raise it in that motion. Two rules work together: FRCP 12(g)(2) bars a second Rule 12 motion raising a defense that was AVAILABLE at the first, and FRCP 12(h)(1) waives a venue defense omitted in those circumstances. By leaving venue out of its first motion, AutoCorp WAIVED ANY IMPROPER-VENUE DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO IT ON DAY 40 - and the facts do not establish whether such a defense existed. The day 100 amendment is too late for any that did. Contrast the SERVICE objections in section 2, which were NOT waived because they did not yet exist on day 40 - that contrast IS the availability limitation of Rule 12(g)(2), and it is the whole lesson here.

**5. BRAKECO'S ANSWER** Source of law FIRST, because this is the classic trap: the case is in the U.S. District Court for the S.D. Fla., and the sufficiency of a pleading filed in federal court is governed by the FEDERAL RULES, not state pleading law (Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)). Do NOT reach for Florida pleading doctrine here. And do not reach for Twombly/Iqbal either - those construe FRCP 8(a)(2), the standard for a CLAIM FOR RELIEF, and say nothing about the sufficiency of a DENIAL. - THE DENIAL: FRCP 8(b)(1)(B) requires a party to admit or deny each allegation. FRCP 8(b)(3) permits a GENERAL denial only where the pleader intends in good faith to deny ALL allegations, including the jurisdictional grounds. REACH THE CONCLUSION: BrakeCo blanket denial VIOLATES Rule 8(b)(3), because BrakeCo necessarily knows its own state of incorporation and cannot deny that allegation in good faith consistently with Rules 8 and 11. Anchor the point there rather than on the jurisdictional clause alone, since BrakeCo could in fact deny the DIVERSITY allegation in good faith (diversity really is destroyed). Be careful with the consequence, because this is where answers overreach. FRCP 8(b)(6) deems an allegation - other than one concerning the AMOUNT OF DAMAGES - ADMITTED where a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is NOT DENIED - and BrakeCo expressly denied everything, so 8(b)(6) does not automatically convert its denials into admissions. An impermissible general denial violates 8(b)(3), and the court may require an AMENDED ANSWER - and may address knowingly false denials under Rule 11. Allegations become admitted under 8(b)(6) only if they ULTIMATELY REMAIN UNDENIED. Do not skip that intermediate step. - THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WAS IDENTIFIED, SUBJECT TO PLEADING SUFFICIENCY. FRCP 8(c)(1) expressly enumerates contributory negligence among the defenses that must be stated affirmatively in the responsive pleading, and BrakeCo did not omit the defense at the answer stage - though the court may require a more factually sufficient amended pleading, and a failure to amend could still cost the defense later. Stop short of calling a bare label unassailable, though: a court may require additional factual detail if the statement does not give fair notice. Whether it would SUCCEED is a different question, governed by whatever substantive law the forum's choice-of-law rules select (Klaxon) - and these facts do not say where the brakes failed or where Paula was injured, so do not decide it.

**KEY POINT:** As pleaded, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction - Paula and BrakeCo are both Florida citizens, so complete diversity fails. Unless the defect is cured by dropping a dispensable nondiverse party under Rule 21, the action must be dismissed. Say this FIRST and treat everything else as alternative analysis.