MBE Constitutional Law Takings: Regulatory vs Physical Trap
Walk through a fresh Fifth Amendment takings hypo with examiner-style analysis on Loretto physical occupation, Lucas total wipeout, and Penn Central balancing.
Walk through a fresh Fifth Amendment takings hypo with examiner-style analysis on Loretto physical occupation, Lucas total wipeout, and Penn Central balancing.
The City of Brookhaven enacts the Coastal Resilience Ordinance to address rising sea levels. Section 1 requires every homeowner on three named coastal blocks to allow the city to install a 3-by-3-inch storm-monitoring sensor on any roof exceeding 30 feet in elevation. The sensor is bolted on permanently. Section 2 prohibits any new vertical construction on lots within 100 feet of the high-tide line. Owen owns a 35-foot beachfront cottage on a covered block; the city installed a sensor on his roof in March without payment or notice. Quentin owns an empty waterfront lot purchased in 2018 for $400,000 with permits in hand to build a four-story rental; under the new Section 2 he can build nothing taller than the existing grade. Both sue the city for an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Owen receives just compensation under Loretto's per se physical-occupation rule. Quentin proceeds under Penn Central balancing, not Lucas, because he retains some residual economic value in the lot. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires just compensation for property taken for public use. Two distinct per se categories trigger automatic compensation. First, any permanent physical occupation by the government, however small, is a per se taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter — the rule does not depend on the size of the intrusion or the economic impact. Second, a regulation that denies an owner ALL economically beneficial use of property is a per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Other regulatory limits that do not entirely destroy economic value are evaluated under the Penn Central balancing framework: (i) economic impact on the owner, (ii) interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (iii) the character of the government action.
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Is the rooftop sensor installation on Owen's house a per se physical taking, and does the height ban on Quentin's lot constitute a per se total regulatory taking under Lucas or only a Penn Central partial regulatory taking?
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires just compensation for property taken for public use. Two distinct per se categories trigger automatic compensation. First, any permanent physical occupation by the government, however small, is a per se taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter — the rule does not depend on the size of the intrusion or the economic impact. Second, a regulation that denies an owner ALL economically beneficial use of property is a per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Other regulatory limits that do not entirely destroy economic value are evaluated under the Penn Central balancing framework: (i) economic impact on the owner, (ii) interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (iii) the character of the government action.
Owen's claim falls within Loretto. The sensor is a permanent, government-mandated physical occupation, regardless of its small footprint. Loretto rejected size-based exceptions when it required compensation for a 1.5-cubic-foot cable box. The threshold question is physical vs regulatory; once an actual occupation exists, no balancing is needed. Owen is entitled to just compensation. Quentin's claim is harder. The Section 2 height ban is a regulation, not an occupation. To trigger Lucas per se, the regulation must wipe out ALL economic value. Quentin still owns the lot; he can hold it, sell it to a buyer who values bare coastal land, use it recreationally, and rebuild if the rule is later relaxed. Some residual value remains, so Lucas does not apply. The analysis falls back on Penn Central. Quentin's investment-backed expectations are crushed — he bought the lot to build a four-story rental and now can build nothing — and the economic impact is severe. Yet the character of the government action is a generally applicable, science-based public-safety response to a documented coastal hazard, which weighs heavily for the city. Whether Quentin prevails turns on how a court balances those factors; the most likely outcome is a substantial Penn Central partial regulatory taking, but it is not a per se Lucas claim.
Owen receives just compensation under Loretto's per se physical-occupation rule. Quentin proceeds under Penn Central balancing, not Lucas, because he retains some residual economic value in the lot.
Loretto rejected size-based exceptions. A permanent occupation, however small, is a per se taking — the cable box in Loretto itself was tiny.
Lucas requires denial of ALL economically beneficial use. Quentin retains the lot's value as land; Lucas does not apply.
A facially applicable regulation supports a takings challenge without further administrative proceedings on the legal classification question.
The Supreme Court has long applied takings principles to both physical and regulatory takings under Pennsylvania Coal, Penn Central, Lucas, and their progeny.