The Self-Driving Collision

Bungee-cording a seven-foot metal extension ladder to the side of a flatbed at highway speeds breaches the ordinary duty of reasonable care. Causation (both but-for and proximate) is clear — a foreseeable risk of improperly secured cargo is exactly what occurred.

Subject: Torts | Points: 10

Dale was acting within the scope of employment when he secured and hauled the load. FastFreight is liable under respondeat superior. The handbook's weak "when practical" language does not immunize the employer. Negligent SUPERVISION fails - it would need evidence FastFreight knew or should have known Dale was unsafe, and the facts give none. A direct NEGLIGENT-POLICY or training claim aimed at the weak instruction is worth flagging, but would need its own causation evidence.

Subject: Torts | Points: 10

Corvus is strictly liable if the integrated obstacle-detection system was defective - because its forward CAMERAS were miscalibrated - when the vehicle left the control of Corvus, and that defect caused foreseeable harm. Camera miscalibration impairing the integrated LIDAR/camera detection system in 2% of a run is more naturally a manufacturing defect (deviation from intended design) than a design defect. These facts do NOT independently support design defect - they show a failure to execute the intended design, not a defective design. That theory would need evidence the intended design itself was defective under the governing test of the jurisdiction (which varies: reasonable alternative design, consumer expectations, or burden-shifting).

Subject: Torts | Points: 15

The internal memo strongly supports Corvus knowledge or notice of the camera miscalibration, and its RECOMMENDATION of a service bulletin over a recall to "contain reputational risk" is strong warning evidence - though the facts do not say the bulletin ever issued. Keep the two theories SEPARATE: failure to warn is general, while a freestanding common-law duty to RECALL is much narrower and exists only in some jurisdictions. Mind the TIMELINE: knowledge acquired BEFORE the vehicle left the control of Corvus supports the ORIGINAL warning duty, and may support a continuing post-sale duty depending on local law; knowledge first acquired AFTER it left that control presents the clearest standalone post-sale theory. RETAIL PURCHASE does not classify the warning duty, though it may bear on notice feasibility, timing and other local-law issues. The facts do not establish whether Corvus learned of the defect before or after this vehicle left its control or was distributed by it - that milestone, not the retail purchase date, separates the theories (the purchase date matters separately, to whether a later notice could reach the owner). Do not stop at breach - CAUSATION is the element these claims most often fail on: an adequate warning must be shown to have altered the outcome - Harper following its effective instruction, whether recalibration or not using Assist (where recognised, a heeding presumption may help, and Pam is two steps removed, since the warning would have gone to Harper).

Subject: Torts | Points: 15

The MANUAL put Harper on notice that she must remain available. Be careful with the chime: the facts describe a system that sounds every 90 seconds IF the driver looks away - they do not establish that it sounded, that Harper perceived it, or that she ignored it. Use it only if evidence shows it sounded and she perceived it before the crash. Opening a laptop and replying to email breaches the ordinary duty of care and is negligent use contrary to the warnings (reserve the label MISUSE for jurisdictions that define it that broadly, since distracted driving is foreseeable). Foreseeability of that use affects the products claim, not Harper's own negligence to Pam.

Subject: Torts | Points: 10

Pam's injuries MAY involve multiple concurrent causes: Dale's dropped ladder, the defective detection system (STRICT liability, not negligence), and Harper's inattention. Only the role of DALE is strongly supported. Corvus and Harper are concurrent causes only if the required timing and avoidance evidence is proved - the defect explains why the detection system failed to register the ladder, but legal causation needs evidence that timely detection would have avoided or mitigated the crash, and Harper's inattention counts only if an attentive driver could have avoided the LADDER impact, OR an available driver could have regained control afterwards and avoided the collision with Pam (there were two impacts). The facts give no detection-time or reaction evidence. The harm is apparently indivisible absent a reasonable basis for causal apportionment, so joint-and-several liability applies here to COMPENSATORY damages.

Subject: Torts | Points: 10

Pam bears no fault, so her recovery is NOT reduced - allocation governs responsibility among liable defendants and their contribution, not the total recoverable by Pam. Harper's own claim against Corvus is reduced by her share of fault only IF the applicable rule permits reduction - the strict-products comparative-responsibility question for a strict theory, ordinary comparative-fault rules for a negligence-based warning or recall theory - AND her conduct is proved causally contributory to her own injuries (collision avoidance or injury enhancement) - negligence alone will not do - with the 51% bar eliminating it above 50%. On sharing, subject to whatever contribution and indemnity rights governing local law recognises: contribution ordinarily runs among INDEPENDENTLY liable parties - and a strict-products defendant is allocated a share only after liability and crash causation are proved under at least one theory (the defect theory needs calibration causation; failure to warn has its own causal route) AND if the jurisdiction puts such defendants on the form - while Dale and FastFreight are one vicarious unit whose internal remedy is INDEMNITY, not proportional contribution.

Subject: Torts | Points: 10

Punitives ride on a successful underlying claim - establish Corvus liability and causation first. The internal memo recommending a service bulletin to "contain reputational risk" is POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT evidence: a manufacturer that knew of a defect and weighed reputational risk. But it does not by itself establish conscious disregard. Real gaps remain for the conscious-disregard and corporate-attribution standards of the jurisdiction - whether Corvus understood the miscalibration created a serious SAFETY risk, whether it knowingly pursued an inadequate response, and whether any decision is attributable to it (the memo RECOMMENDED a bulletin; the facts do not say whether it issued, who decided, or whether senior actors ratified it). State the BURDEN too: most jurisdictions require punitives to be proved by CLEAR AND CONVINCING evidence, not a preponderance.

Subject: Torts | Points: 10

Harper has a potential direct products claim for the injuries she sustained in the crash and airbag deployment (the theory is the detection-system defect - no airbag defect is alleged). Her negligent use reduces recovery only if TWO things hold: the applicable rule permits reduction (the special strict-products question for a strict theory; ordinary comparative-fault rules for a negligence-based warning or recall theory), AND her conduct is proved to have causally contributed to HER injuries - either by collision avoidance (an attentive driver had warning and time) or by injury enhancement (the laptop worsened the airbag injuries). Negligence alone is not enough. If finder concludes Harper's fault ≤50%, she recovers her $40,000 reduced by her percentage; if >50%, she recovers nothing under the 51% bar. (This jurisdiction stipulates the bar; note that some jurisdictions apply comparative fault differently to strict products claims.)

Subject: Torts | Points: 5

Pam recovers proven reasonable and necessary economic damages (she claims $180,000 medical + $60,000 lost wages) and non-economic pain-and-suffering damages. Collateral-source and insurance offsets are jurisdiction-dependent.

Subject: Torts | Points: 5